the ways in which this understanding of Kantian constructivism fits within the broader comparative project in ‘moral theory’ that. Rawls inherits from Sidgwick. The author outlines the chief features of the constructivist moral conception in its Kantian KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY. John Rawls. The papers by Rawls most relevant here are: “Kantian Constructivism in Moral. Theory: The Dewey Lectures ,” Journal of Philosophy 77 ():
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Political Constructivism in Social and Political Philosophy. Constructivists must deny the correspondence theory of truth, the view that truth is correspondence to a fact.
Either the practical standpoint is subject to moral constraints or it is not. Whether agents have conclusive reasons to be agents, however, might depend on the particular version of constitutivism.
To this extent, her defense of Kantian constructivism does not offer a distinctive reply to skeptical challenges to ethical objectivity. Others argue for additional but related principles, which regulate attention and disregard James, kajtian for others having equal standing Bagnoli bbenevolence and non-interference Smith We must use our rational powers to figure out what these principles are. For instance, by making a poor judgment about what to do in self-defense, one mischaracterizes and misunderstands what self-defense is and what it requires.
For instance, constructivjsm concept equity does not stand for a property; thsory, it proposes a response to the practical problem of how to distribute goods.
From the Publisher via CrossRef no proxy jstor. The relevant norms and their applications to practical reasoning are the work of practical wisdom phronesisin conjunction with the excellences of character, as Aristotle suggests LeBar a.
Related Entries anti-realism cognitivism vs. Kant is keenly aware of the air of paradox surrounding the claim that the moral concepts, such as good and evil, are not determined prior to engaging in practical reasoning, but only as a result of engaging in practical reasoning.
In order to value ourselves under these specific descriptions, we must value humanity in ourselves and in others Korsgaard Reprinted in Rawls In contrast to Kantian constructivism, however, Humean constructivists abandon the claim that moral obligations are requirements of practical reason.
Furthermore, by analogy with attitudes such as love, which is both contingent and compelling, Street argues that the fact that moral commitments are contingent does not weaken their normative force.
She departs from the versions of Kantian constructivism discussed above because she makes no appeal to transcendental arguments and rejects the idealized conceptions of rational agency that are at play in other versions of Kantian constructivism. A thing that does not serve this purpose is not a house.
Realists presume that, in order to fend off skepticism, one has to anchor practical reasons in facts that are in themselves normative. Oxford University Press, chapter 7, doi: The wise and virtuous agents form the standard of practical rationality through the exercise of their virtues of intellect and character Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, II. To this extent, this metaethical view shares the ambitions of Kantian constructivism to ground normative truths in features of rational agency.
But they all find that the notion of construction is a distinctive explanatory device for capturing the objectivity and normativity of ethical truths. All constructivists share a commitment to naturalism, but reject eholding that the instantiation of properties depend on features of our sensibility or rational agency, rather than being mind-independent.
The key feature of this account is the claim that practical rationality does not merely direct motal affective responses toward adequate objects but also structurally conatructivism our animal sensibility into character. Korsgaard argues that an Aristotelian account of the virtues as excellences of character should play an important role in a complete account of what makes a good moral agent.
KANTIAN CONSTRUCTIVISM IN MORAL THEORY
But the moral law obliges us only insofar as it is self-legislated. Oxford University Press, First, the objection can be that constructivism relies on moral intuitions, which it never proves. While this criticism is addressed especially to Kantian constructivism, in some sense it threatens all views that appeal to constitutive norms of reasoning Ripstein ; Enochb.
Skepticism is avoided only if reason is accounted as autonomous, and its authority does not derive from anything outside it. V; in Practical PhilosophyA. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge: Besch – – Journal of Value Inquiry 42 1: Constructivists hold that the appeal to such constraints is neither arbitrary nor does it commit constructivism to moral realism.
Constructivism in Metaethics
This criticism rests on the assumption that there is a sharp division between normative ethics and metaethics. There are two ways of formulating and motivating this objection. The property of being right is constituted by what a group of reasonable agents, under certain specified conditions, would find non-rejectable Scanlon Like pragmatism, constructivism appeals to the practical point of view to account theoryy truth, in contrast to standard forms of realism about truth Proulx ; Elgin ; Richardson ; Schwartz As a result, practical reasoning justifies the prohibition to harm, coerce, and deceive others.
Substantive realism holds that there are objective criteria of theofy for moral judgments only if such judgments represent matters of fact about the way the world is. In this respect, the Aristotelians claim to have a consyructivism advantage because Aristotelian constructivism allows practical reasoning to adapt to particular cases. But the steps in reasoning of this kind involve making substantive judgments about what reasons we have.
John Rawls, Kantian constructivism in moral theory – PhilPapers
In section 6 we will consider how this form of constructivism relates to anti-realism and expressivism. Oxford University Press,61— In his view, the fact of reason indicates that the deliverances of practical reason cohere with our kanitan experience.
How does awareness of this fact rationally compel us to refrain from deceiving? In her more recent work, Korsgaard replies that to count as acting at all, we must at least be trying to follow the principles of practical reason, but she allows that we may fail to do so adequately or fully Korsgaard Because it requires such judgments as inputs, reasoning of this kind is not a process through which all facts about reasons are constructed Scanlon Constitutivists reply that agency is unlike any other particular activity.
First, critics dispute the force and the target of the objection of heteronomy. The differences among these views can be illustrated by comparing their respective diagnoses of a fictional Caligula whose state of mind is completely coherent but who values torturing people for fun Street This is because realism simply assumes the existence of objective standards for morality without offering a rational basis for them; hence the realist affirms what the skeptic denies.
However, sophisticated subjectivism importantly relies on sensibility, while Kantian constructivism requires that normative truths be dependent on features of rational agency.